Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the...

In this paper, we examine the motivation behind mandatory retirement policies that force CEOs to retire. Consistent with these policies being effective ways to ease out CEOs, we find that firms without mandatory retirement policies are valued lower and have poorer operating performance than...

This paper evaluates hedge fund performance through portfolio strategies that incorporate predictability based on macroeconomic variables. Incorporating predictability substantially improves out-of-sample performance for the entire universe of hedge funds as well as for various investment...

Mutual fund companies frequently assign multiple funds to one portfolio manager. This study examines the consequences of such “multitasking” arrangements. We find that, despite fund companies choosing more qualified managers to run multiple funds, multitasking is associated with...

Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds’ investment horizon, we find that affected funds influence portfolio firms to reduce the pay duration of their executives to incentivize them to also have shorter...

We find a negative relation between hedge fund manager’s personal income tax rates and fund performance. Using changes in tax deferral regulation or state-level tax rates suggest causality in the tax-performance relation. Managers are less likely to hold stocks with greater information...