We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

Shareholder say-on-pay votes allow institutional investors to influence the incentives of managers and, consequently, corporate behaviour. Surprisingly, the preferences of investors on executive compensation have been largely overlooked in the ongoing debates on sustainable corporate behaviour....

Using a large sample of institutional investors' investments in private equity funds raised between 1991 and 2011, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects their returns. Bootstrap analyses show that the variance of actual performance is higher than would be expected by chance,...

Existing global ESG models are limited in terms of applicability and predictability, especially in countries with an unstable environment. On the other hand, utilizing internally made or privately sourced ESG models have caused issues relating to generalizability, comparability, and continuity....