We study the transfer of governance across countries through overlapping boards. Companies converge to the governance characteristics and board practices of foreign firms through their directors' foreign board experiences. Learning from foreign firms' governance practices is as important as...

We use the exposure of U.S. firms’ directors to the staggered introduction of sustainability disclosure reforms in foreign countries to study the role of the board of directors in shaping corporate sustainability. Using a difference-in-differences design, we document that the board has a...

We find that the directorial labor market's ability to align the incentives of managers and shareholders depends on the aggregate level of investor protection in a country. If a country's corporate governance environment is strong and boards are likely to protect the interest of shareholders, a...

We find that the strength of countries' legal institutions can explain the ability of private firms to identify and terminate poorly performing managers. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that governance problems in private firms are ameliorated by strong institutions that reduce...