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Stock options and chief executive officer compensation

Armstrong, Christopher (contributor); … - 2007

theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we … optimal contract. This result is robust to alternative assumptions about the level of CEO risk-aversion and the disutility … associated with their effort. In a supplementary analysis, we solve for the optimal contract when there are no restrictions on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064

Menuless and Preference-Free Screening Contracts for Fund Managers

He, Xue Dong; Hu, Sang; Kou, Steven - 2021

any manager who is unfavorable to some investors. The contract problem has hidden types, hidden actions, hidden knowledge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225865

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi - 2019

This paper investigates the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation, using panel data constructed for the S&P 1500 firms on CEO compensation, financial returns, and reported accounting income. Empirically SOX (i) changes the relationship between a firm's abnormal returns and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904043

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2021

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a dynamic principal-agent model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240930

All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation

Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024

This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841

Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2022

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244206

Economic Consequences of Managerial Compensation Contract Disclosure

Xiong, Yan; Jiang, Xu - 2022

We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting …. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads … not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298722

Incentivizing team leaders : a firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills

Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2023

manufacturing firm, introducing a relative subjective performance evaluation of team leaders' leadership activities by their …, suggesting that the subjective evaluation indeed increased leadership activities and thus productivity. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019

Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent

Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020

We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115

Family or Nonfamily? CEO Appointment in a Multitask Model with Economic and Non-Economic Tasks

Kragl, Jenny - 2019

Prior economic research is very critical about family CEOs and family management. Nepotism, altruism, lower managerial abilities, and a small pool of qualified family candidates are cited as reasons that speak against family management. Still, the empirical reality is different. A surprisingly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895440