We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent's action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

The empirical literature shows that management incentives often reduce corporate tax aggressiveness. Focussing on the riskiness of tax aggressiveness this paper offers one explanation for the observed negative relation. Using an agency framework, I analyze the manager's choice of effort...

In this study, we investigate the association between financial constraints, at both the macroeconomic and firm-specific level, and one potentially significant source of internal funds available to firms – cash savings generated through tax planning. In equilibrium a firm will undertake tax...

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...

We investigate the impact of tax-related human capital (THC) on corporate financial reporting aggressiveness. Using the presence of former or current tax officers from tax authorities on a firm's board of directors as a proxy for THC, we find that firms with tax officer directors report their...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interest affect corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that appointing affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker directors,...