This paper studies the relation between managerial power, the manager's compensation contract, and firm performance when the manager's contract comprises a stock-based pay and a fixed salary. When there is no cap on the manager's salary, the size of the manager's stock-based compensation is the...

This study documents a positive and robust effect of co-opted boards on firm innovation. This effect is mainly driven by co-opted independent directors. Firms with more co-opted independent directors are associated with lower sensitivities of CEO pay-performance and turnover-performance. It...

Managerial discretion is likely to be beneficial to shareholders because of strategic cross-effects in an oligopoly. In certain circumstance, shareholders deliberately keep certain managerial discretion in equilibrium even the reduction of managerial discretion is cost free. It is found that...

Managerial discretion is likely to be beneficial to shareholders because of strategic cross-effects in an oligopoly. In certain circumstances, shareholders deliberately retain managerial discretion in equilibrium even when the reduction of managerial discretion is cost free. It is found that the...