This paper investigates the relation between investor sentiment, executive compensation and corporate investment. We derive a model that shows the share price will be jointly affected by investor sentiment and the corporate investment decision. The model predicts that, if a compensation contract...

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a...

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a...

We use exogenous changes in the probability that firms adopt executive ownership guidelines (EOGs) to measure the influence of board connections on the spreading of executive compensation policy. EOGs require managers to hold pre-specified equity ownership levels, and their use has increased...

Current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment benefits shareholders. We investigate the wealth effects associated with the SEC's rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. Our results are not in line with shareholder empowerment creating value:...