We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...

This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

This study examines the effect of directors' pay on insolvency risk in member-owned organisations, such as credit unions. This research uses a unique setting of Australian credit unions, where a significant shift is observed from a traditional volunteer board nature to one that compensates...

Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentives that the exposure of a CEO's wealth to his firm's stock price (delta) creates in highly levered firms. We find evidence consistent with the importance of these incentives for bank CEOs: In a...

The article presents an original research on 1) the information theory of the board of directors and 2) the strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the firms in an information century. We review the possible structures of the board of...

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of...

This project explores the link between managerial overconfidence and banks' asset valuation behavior in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Using intra-bank variations, it provides empirical evidence that banks with overconfident CFOs rely more heavily on valuation models designed for...

We employ a unique sample of 5000 outside directorships held by German executive bank directors over 1993-2015 to examine whether these directorships proxy reputational capital and/or bankers' private information. We exploit various circumstances of executive directors' appointments and bank...