We find strong evidence that when the customer base is more concentrated, the supplier firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in compensation. This finding is robust to numerous alternative specifications and to different approaches that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, we show...

Using the Great Recession of 2007-2009 as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that CEOs' work experience is significantly related to firm stock performance while their endowed traits play a limited role in the recession. No CEO characteristics matter during the pre-recession period. CEOs who...

This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives...

This paper studies the long-term consequences of actions induced by vesting equity, a measure of short-term incentives. Vesting equity is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a...