We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect a firm's acquisition behavior. We find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with a higher probability of subsequent acquisitions, and such positive relation is not driven by reverse causality. Focusing...

We investigate whether and how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, we report that socially connected CEOs receive significantly more similar compensation than non-connected CEOs. This...

We study the disciplinary role of short-maturity debt in cash-rich firms. We report evidence that such debt mitigates cash-rich firms' overinvestment in acquisitions. The disciplinary role is mostly concentrated among cash-rich firms that are weakly governed and have limited access to the public...

We study the disciplinary role of short-maturity debt in cash-rich firms. We report evidence that such debt mitigates cash-rich firms' overinvestment in acquisitions. The disciplinary role is mostly concentrated among cash-rich firms that are weakly governed and have limited access to the public...

We show that CEOs exhibit a hometown bias in acquisitions. Firms are over twice as likely to acquire targets located in the states of their CEOs' childhood homes than similar targets domiciled elsewhere. Small, private home-state deals underperform other small, private deals, and the bias is...

During the recent financial crisis, capital flow to hedge funds plunged, and competition among hedge fund managers intensified. This leads to a transfer of bargaining power from hedge fund managers to investors when negotiating fund managers' compensation contracts. We use a signaling game...