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Conventional wisdom suggests that CEO membership of the compensation committee is an open invitation to rent extraction by self-serving executives. However, using data from New Zealand – where CEO compensation committee membership was rel- atively common until quite recently – we find that...
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This note describes how meaningful measures of executive compensation can be extracted from the proxy statements that firms send to shareholders each year. It shows where the information needed to calculate such measures can be found and why the most informative measures of executive pay differ...
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We show how CEO ownership and the market for corporate control interact to influence the investment-timing decisions of empire-building CEOs. The prospect of a future takeover means that CEOs with no ownership stake will over-invest in some types of projects and under-invest in others, but these...
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