We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This study examines boardroom connections that form when corporate executives sit on mutual fund boards. These connections have the potential to facilitate information flow that informs fund investment decisions. I find that fund trades in the executive’s firm anticipate future earnings news...

We examine ballot order effects in independent director elections. Our results show that down-ballot directors receive considerably less opposition from shareholders. This result holds in a sample where directors are positioned alphabetically on the proxy ballot, and, thus unrelated to the...

This paper examines the effect of competition in the product markets on the design of a firm's governance structure. In oligopolies, profits are not just a function of a firm's own actions but also of the actions taken by rivals. Firms therefore behave strategically and commit to actions which...

We study the propensity of firms to commit financial fraud using a sample of SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2006. Controlling for year effects, Fama-French 48-industry effects, and several firm characteristics, we find a significant relation between fraud probability and CEO-board...

We study the relation between fraud and CEO-board connectedness. While nonprofessional connections due to shared non-business service or alma mater increase fraud probability, professional connections from employment overlaps lower the incidence of fraud. The benefits of professional...