In this study, focusing on the period 1996-2010, we conduct an empirical investigation of how warnings by industry peer firms about future earnings affect CEO compensation structure. These warnings contain information about the industry, signaling dim industry prospects and possibly triggering...

Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation...

Institutional investors, policy makers, and researchers have advocated for greater director independence in hopes of improving corporate governance and discouraging unethical behaviors such as corporate frauds, accounting irregularities, and other organizational failures. However, increasing...

We argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts introduce a tournament among the focal firm and peer firms. We test whether a firm's riskiness is altered by its CEO's incentive to win the tournament. We find that a firm with an interim losing CEO takes more risk in the remainder of...

Pulchronomics is the economics study of beauty. Given the importance of CEOs in wealth creation, we study CEO pulchronomics by first examining whether a beauty premium exists in CEO compensation. Since earnings gaps need to be accounted for differences in productivity, we also investigate...