We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm’s performance and more for their rivals’ performance if an industry’s firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

General Motor's ability to exit bankruptcy through a public offering of its common stock (IPO) depended heavily on the sacrifices of active and retired members of the United Auto Workers (UAW). A review of the now public filings of GM related to the IPO indicate the significant concessions UAW...

This paper develops a framework for studying individuals' ideas about what constitutes just compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay and the principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master of Business...

This paper investigates preferences for limiting top incomes and wealth through a surveybased experiment with a large sample of participants (N = 3,954) from the US and Germany. Using a revealed preferences approach, we find that a significant majority (around 85%) of participants support income...

This study investigates the impact of communication on outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a ‘free-communication’ device. Using both students and managers as subjects, we find that...

Based on a price setting duopoly model, this paper argues that collusion on managerial incentive compensation may have the equivalent effect to collusion on prices. This paper also provides an analysis of the effect of different antitrust fines regimes in the context of a game between two...

We investigate the choice of endogenous timing by managerial firms in the presence of network externalities under Bertrand competition. Contrast to the results of sequentiality in equilibrium, we demonstrate that when managers are being delegated both the market and timing decision, there exists...

We investigate the differentiated duopoly and triopoly markets in which firms can choose to strategically delegate when the biased managers hold about the market demand incorrectly under Bertrand competition. Contrast to previous studies under duopoly, one firm chooses delegate, while the other...

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies with the incentive schemes offered by the owners, then the well-known results of equilibrium incentive scheme (by Fershtman and Judd, 1987, A.E.R.) get modified. In case of...