We find that firms with a corporate general counsel in top management (TMC) are less likely to pay dividends, and for such firms that do pay dividends, the dividend payouts are lower. Our results hold addressing both endogeneity concerns and selection biases. We also find that the presence of a...

We find that firms with a top management counsel (TMC) have lower stock price crash risk than other firms. We further show that firms with a TMC issue more negative relative to positive earnings guidance and use more negative relative to positive words in their annual report filings, compared to...

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with...

We analyze the direct impacts of managerial overconfidence upon the dividend decision and demonstrate that the dividend levels and speeds of adjustment to target levels can increase when managers exhibit overconfidence. However, we demonstrate that the directional impact upon dividend levels...