We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This study examines boardroom connections that form when corporate executives sit on mutual fund boards. These connections have the potential to facilitate information flow that informs fund investment decisions. I find that fund trades in the executive’s firm anticipate future earnings news...

We examine ballot order effects in independent director elections. Our results show that down-ballot directors receive considerably less opposition from shareholders. This result holds in a sample where directors are positioned alphabetically on the proxy ballot, and, thus unrelated to the...