In this study, we examine the effect of accrual-based earnings management on the association between managers' earnings forecast errors and accruals, which we label “managers' accrual-related forecast bias.” We build on extensive research which finds that managers engage in accrual-based...

We investigate whether companies strategically change accounting estimates to manipulate earnings, as some claim (“opportunism” hypothesis), or whether these modifications represent changes in the underlying fundamentals of financially troubled or risky companies updating their priors about...

We understand relatively little about factors that affect the internal audit function's ability to serve as an important monitor of financial reporting quality. We therefore study how turnover of the chief audit executive (CAE) influences financial reporting quality and stakeholders'...

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. This paper asks why rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which provides testable...

We provide evidence that firms managed by CEOs with high general ability, or broad experience in their background, are more likely to utilize discretionary accruals to manage earnings than CEOs with focused experience. Cross-sectional variation suggests that the mechanism underlying the...

Televised media interviews with public company CEOs occur nearly every trading day. During these interviews, investors observe visual cues in addition to hearing the verbal information managers disclose. Building on findings in the psychology and communications literature, we ask whether...

Our study explores how managerial stock holdings and option holdings affect CEOs' income smoothing incentives. Given the different roles of stock holdings and option holdings in solving agency problems, managers may smooth past earnings using discretionary accruals for the purpose of revealing...

This study examines the impact of CEO inside debt on earnings management. Theory predicts that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings adopt less risky corporate policies and choose investment policies that result in less volatile earnings. Under such circumstances, CEOs would face weaker demand...

Audit subordinates typically work with multiple supervisors who are likely to vary in their level of coaching quality (CQ). While prior research suggests a low CQ supervisor could negatively affect a subordinate's work attitudes, theory indicates that the presence of other positive coaching...

During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or...