We study the propensity of firms to commit financial fraud using a sample of SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2006. Controlling for year effects, Fama-French 48-industry effects, and several firm characteristics, we find a significant relation between fraud probability and CEO-board...

We study the relation between fraud and CEO-board connectedness. While nonprofessional connections due to shared non-business service or alma mater increase fraud probability, professional connections from employment overlaps lower the incidence of fraud. The benefits of professional...

We test whether a director's diversity relative to the rest of the board explains two important labor market outcomes, retention and promotion. We find that the results are asymmetric across diversity dimensions and outcomes. Retention is more likely but promotion is less likely for...

What economic forces limit mutual fund managers from generating consistent outperformance? We propose and test the hypothesis that buy-side competition from other funds matters. We make three contributions in this regard. First, we propose new style-based spatial methods to identify the...

This paper examines the effect of competition in the product markets on the design of a firm's governance structure. In oligopolies, profits are not just a function of a firm's own actions but also of the actions taken by rivals. Firms therefore behave strategically and commit to actions which...

We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...