We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability...

We find that banks governed by more socially connected CEOs have a higher degree of systemic risk than those governed by less socially connected CEOs. We employ a difference-in-differences design and the instrumental variable method to address endogeneity concerns, using CEO death as an...

We find that banks governed by more socially connected CEOs have a higher degree of systemic risk than those governed by less socially connected CEOs. We employ a difference-in-differences design and the instrumental variable method to address endogeneity concerns, using CEO death as an...

We use the unique nature of the director and officer liability protection law applicable to Nevada-incorporated firms to study how liability protection is related to corporate tax avoidance. We find that firms incorporated in Nevada avoid 32 percent more federal corporate tax as a fraction of...

Financial contracts are strongly influenced by the perception that transacting parties have of each other. Hence, if contracting counterparties such as banks perceive that there is a difference in the likelihood that CEOs with conservative and liberal political orientation will discharge their...