We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when...

I study how mutual funds invest in public U.S. firms where founding family members retain a significant portion of shares. I posit that informed funds exploit the opaque nature of family firms by holding large positions when they have good private signals about the firms. By studying actively...

We use transactional level data on institutional trading around CEO turnovers to analyze the information flows and settings that allow information production and trading to act as an effective corporate governance mechanism. We find that institutional trading prior to a CEO turnover is...

We examine the efficacy of proxy voting to limit inflated CEO pay. We find that the percentage of dissenting votes that go against director-sponsored compensation proposals increases following a staggered rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (RIDD), which increases CEOs’ job...