We examine the effects of CEO neuroticism on corporate policies for cash holdings. We hand-collect the tweets by CEOs at S&P 1500 companies to measure their neuroticism. We find that firms with relatively neurotic CEOs hold more cash than other CEOs. Using two crises as shocks to corporate...

We show that firms take more (but not necessarily excessive) risks when one of their directors experiences a corporate bankruptcy at another firm where they concurrently serve as a director. This increase in risk-taking is concentrated among firms where the director experiences a shorter,...

This paper investigates the role of managerial biases in the real effects of limits to arbitrage. In a natural experiment setting with Regulation SHO, we find that the lifting of short sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in CEO confidence for pilot firms, and this result is more...

We examine whether CEO extraversion, an important personality trait associated with leadership, affects firms' expected cost of equity capital. We measure CEO extraversion using CEOs' speech patterns during the unscripted portion of conference calls. After controlling for several CEO and firm...

We examine the effects of CEO big five personalities (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the S&P 1500 CEO tweets and use IBM personality insights to measure CEO personality. CEOs with high ratings of...

This paper examines the associations of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs’) prosocial behavior with their career paths and corporate policies. Using individuals’ involvement with charitable organizations as a proxy for prosocial behavior, we find that prosocial individuals are promoted to...

We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs' attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an...

We study whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the characteristics of the executives subject to these mechanisms - namely, their “psychological type”, as proxied by their history of legal infractions. In particular, we examine insider trading, where...

Using detailed mutual fund holdings in the US market, we estimate active mutual fund managers’ loss aversion as a function of both funds’ past performance and asset allocations. We document a substantial variation in loss aversion over time. We further find managers' loss aversion is higher...