This paper analyses the impact of CEO relative compensation on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a sample of takeover deals between Australian listed targets and bidders from 2000 to 2015, we find that there is insignificant difference between bid premiums offered by CEOs who...

The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market,...

This paper examines the length of time over which CEO performance is evaluated (the “performance period”) in CEO performance-based equity awards (PBEAs). Departing from the primary emphasis of agency theory on moral hazard problems, we develop a model in which short performance periods are...

Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we...

We investigate the consequences for losing competitors following the end of a promotion tournament. We examine CEO tournaments and find that the total incentives of non-promoted executives (NPEs) are likely to decrease significantly at the end of a tournament based on evidence of their lower...