In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the intensity of their strategic interactions and plausible interventions. We...

This internet appendix provides additional analyses and robustness checks to support the main findings of the paper.The paper, Teaming Up and Quiet Intervention: The Impact of Institutional Investors on Executive Compensation Policies, may be found at: 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475347'...

This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk-taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors...

We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the...