This paper uses a new data set of 3,954 US CEO employment agreements to study their contractual time horizon. Longer contracts offer protection against dismissals: turnover probability increases by 12% each year closer to expiration. This should encourage CEOs to pursue long-term projects, and...

The multitask principal-agent theory argues that incentive devices for the agent tend to be complementary due to the need for balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. A growing body of empirical literature appears to support this notion. However, when there can be several signals for each...

The multitask agency theory argues that incentive devices for the agent need to be viewed as a system to induce balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. This important insight has not been incorporated into the empirical study of CEO compensation. Since there can be several measures for...

Because each of the agent's multitasks can have several measures, the multitask agency theory predicts that incentive devices based on these measures can be complements or substitutes. However, the existing empirical literature on multitask agency considers only complementarity. This paper...

This paper independently replicates the results of the survey of experienced financial managers reported in section 4 of Libby and Rennekamp (2012). Using the same questions as Libby and Rennekamp (2012), we survey 110 experienced managers to examine their beliefs about the relationship between...