Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038891
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911869
This paper investigates under what circumstances boards of directors fire CEOs and whether this action leads to better firm performance. We use unique and detailed data, covering 473 companies in the transition region, on boards’ actions, expectations and beliefs about CEO ability. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003916269
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009730870
We document how gathering ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information helps boards of directors to learn a CEO’s ability over time; test under what circumstances boards fire CEOs; and show that such interventions lead to improved firm performance. Our empirical design exploits detailed hard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035444
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012265630
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equitybacked firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940695
CEO outside directorships are an important phenomenon; however, little is known about their influence on managerial decision making. We investigate how CEOs react after they observe, as a director of another firm, a labor strike that is plausibly exogenous to their firm. They increase cash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902520