This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...

This study adopts behavioral contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed–salary contract is preferable to incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is higher under an incentives–based contract...

This paper examines the CEO compensation gap between gender and the female CEOs’ risk preference for incentive. Previous studies argue that women in upper positions receive lower compensation and incentive than men due to their risk-averse tendency. Meanwhile, the literature suggests no...

Developments in executive compensation have resulted in more legislation and regulations on executive pay being introduced over the past two decades than in the previous hundred and fifty years. Ever since the last financial crisis, executive compensation has remained high on the agenda of many...

We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms’ strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay...

n this paper we examine the agency costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEO's within the FTSE 100 in the last decade. Are CEOs taking a large proportion of the total pot (a big "pay slice") more, or less, able to return value to shareholders by better management? In presenting this...