Do executives demand a premium for working in polluted environments? We develop a model of optimal CEO compensation and find empirical support for its prediction that pollution will induce a higher fixed wage, but lower incentive pay. This is the case even if we exclude polluting firms. We...

We examine the impact of overconfidence on compensation structure. We test alternative hypotheses, drawing upon and extending existing theories. Our findings support the exploitation hypothesis: firms offer incentive-heavy compensation contracts to overconfident CEOs to exploit their...

We propose and test the hypothesis that overconfident-CEOs, with upwardly-biased estimates of own firm-value, are more predisposed to repurchasing stock. An implication is that the stock-market, recognizing overconfident-CEO behavior, will react less positively to repurchase announcements. The...

Do firms tailor compensation contracts to fit CEOs' individual behavioral traits, and if so, how? We explore this by focusing on CEOs' early life exposure to 'extreme fatality' disasters. Prior literature shows that this can drive agency conflicts of risk aversion. We hypothesize and show that...