Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

This paper reports the prevalence of a “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. The way firms distribute total compensation across different components of pay –salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites–...

In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find...

Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that CEOs' political connections are valuable to firms. We examine whether such connections become constraints if the expected political capital fails to materialize and the firm lacks other type of political power in place. Using a sample of...

Using a news-based index of aggregate policy uncertainty in the US economy, we document a strong negative relation between policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking. We show that high levels of policy uncertainty are associated with significantly lower future stock return volatility at the...

This paper investigates whether CEO pay disparity reflects efficient contracting or CEO entrenchment by exploiting an exogenous event which mandated option expensing, namely, the introduction of FAS 123R. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find supportive evidence for the entrenchment...

Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common...

This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...

[This article is a revised and condensed version of Jesse Fried and Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798185]The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to adopt clawback policies for recovering certain types of excess pay — overpayments resulting from errors in...

The study attempts to analyze the trends and patterns in executive compensation for 30 companies, which are among the largest listed companies on Bombay Stock Exchange over the past 13 years. It tries to establish link between executive remuneration, corporate governance and firm performance for...