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Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences : optimal CEO compensation and turnover

Vasama, Suvi - 2016

We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

Are CEOs paid extra for riskier pay packages?

Albuquerque, Ana; Albuquerque, Rui; Carter, Mary Ellen; … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301018

Regulating executive pay : Incentive contracts and nonbinding bonus caps

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 177 (2021) 1, pp. 81-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807212

Contracting with Long-Term Consequences

Vasama, Suvi - 2017

I examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950502

Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Journal of business economics and management 16 (2015) 4, pp. 712-732

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383053

Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard

Sun, Bo - 2010

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148954

Executive Compensation and Earnings Management under Moral Hazard

Sun, Bo - 2009

The paper investigates the optimal structure of executive compensation with the possibility of financial data manipulation. We characterize the optimal compensation contract analytically, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for earnings management to occur. The model shows that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156138

Executive Compensation and Earnings Management under Moral Hazard

Sun, Bo - 2013

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We show that an increase in the possibility of manipulation actually calls for executive pay to be more responsive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089812

Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 775-818

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549241