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We characterize the optimal incentive scheme for a manager who faces costly effort decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the firm varies stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions and...
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I examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950502
We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015406454
In this study, insider trading activity is used as part of a managerial compensation structure. The wage structure changes with the tenure duration of the insider. Managers with shorter tenure rely more on insider profits as part of their compensation. On the other hand, managers with longer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001353
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912553
We study dynamic incentive contracts in a continuous-time agency model with productivity switching between two unobserved states, about which an investor may learn by deviating from the myopically optimal action. The optimal contract balances short-run profits from myopic actions and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109124