Using a stochastic sequential game in ergodic equilibrium, this paper models limit order book trading dynamics. It deduces investor surplus and some agents` strategies from depth`s stationarity, while bypassing altogether agents` intricate forecasting problems. Market inefficiency adjusts to...

Prediction (or information) markets are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events. Studying prediction markets allows to avoid many problems, which arise in some artificially designed behavioral experiments investigating collective decision making...

This paper presents an adaptive learning model for market-making under the reinforcement learn-ing framework. Reinforcement learning is a learning technique in which agents aim to maximize the long-term accumulated rewards. No knowledge of the market environment, such as the order arrival or...

This paper argues that a guru possessing a multi-dimensional informational advantage may want to truthfully report her opinion to the media to learn more out of the actions of other, sometimes better-informed traders.