We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. Furthermore, we examine the welfare...

In this paper we show that price equalization alone is not sufficient to determine the barriers to international trade. There are many barrier combinations that deliver price equalization, but each combination implies a different volume of trade. We demonstrate this first theoretically in a...

In this article, the authors demonstrate the possibility of price equalization in a two-country world with barriers to international trade. For price equalization to occur when the countries are asymmetric, the country with higher productivity must also be the one with the lower trade barrier. A...

We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. Furthermore, we examine the welfare...

We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. Furthermore, we examine the welfare...

In this paper we show that price equalization alone is not sufficient to determine the barriers to international trade. There are many barrier combinations that deliver price equalization, but each combination implies a different volume of trade. We demonstrate this first theoretically in a...

In this paper we show that price equalization alone is not sufficient to determine the barriers to international trade. There are many barrier combinations that deliver price equalization, but each combination implies a different volume of trade. We demonstrate this first theoretically in a...

We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. Furthermore, we examine the welfare...