This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov...

This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are...

Suppliers often make proactive investments in capacity to strategically position themselves to win a contract with a monopolist buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers' variable costs of serving the buyer's demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the...

Coordinating the timing and location of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition, and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. The authors build a model...

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact. We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players. This theory of conduct...

In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of...

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of...

We present a two-firm model of predation under complete information, based on different discount factors, and integrate it with a model of collusion. Competition, collusion and predation are seen as alternative strategies. The basic conclusions are that there is predation when one firm has a...

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the...