We develop a sequential trade model of Iceberg order execution in a limit order book. The Iceberg-trader has the freedom to expose his trading intentions or (partially) shield the true order size against other market participants. Order exposure can cause drastic market reactions ("market...

We cross-sectionally analyze the presence of aggregated hidden depth and trade volume in the S&P 500 and identify its key determinants. We find that the spread is the main predictor for a stock's hidden dimension, both in terms of traded and posted liquidity. Our findings moreover suggest that...

We develop a model of an order-driven exchange competing for order flow with off-exchange trading mechanisms. Liquidity suppliers face a trade-off between benefits and costs of order exposure. If they display trading intentions, they attract additional trade demand. We show, in equilibrium,...

We develop a model of an order-driven exchange competing for order flow with off-exchange trading mechanisms. Large investors can trade in either the primary market or the off-exchange market and induce liquidity externalities. Liquidity suppliers in the primary market face a trade-off between...

We take advantage of a unique data set, NASDAQ ModelView, to empirically analyze the determinants and the impact of hidden liquidity on public exchanges. Our findings are as follows. First, the cross-sectional presence of hidden liquidity is well explained by observable and readily available...

In illiquid markets, option traders may have an incentive to increase their portfolio value by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. We provide a mathematical framework within which to value derivatives under market impact in a multi-player framework by introducing strategic...

In this article the problem of curve following in an illiquid market is addressed. Using techniques of singular stochastic control, we extend the results of [NW11] to a twosided limit order market with temporary market impact and resilience, where the bid ask spread is now also controlled. We...

We show that the excessive use of hidden orders causes artificial price pressures and abnormal asset returns. Using a simple game-theoretical setting, we demonstrate that this effect naturally arises from mis-coordination in trading schedules between traders, when suppliers of liquidity do not...