Each of n = 1 identical buyers (and m = 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m n and among the sellers when m n; the long side gets nothing. We...

The matching market (MM) institution is a two-sided auction procedure that collects bids from buyers and asks from sellers, and iteratively matches the highest remaining bid with the highest remaining ask less than or equal to it. This chapter summarizes a first laboratory experiment comparing...

Each of n ≥ 1 identical buyers (and m ≥ 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m n and among the sellers when m n; the long side gets nothing. We...