We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …

unaffected. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions in matching theory, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These …

. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some … number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a …