In this paper, we propose a new cycle criterion, Cyclical Conflicts (CCs), for preference profiles in two-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the...

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride-sharing platform in China to estimate a continuous-time dynamic model of search and match between drivers and passengers. We assess the efficiency of the decentralized market by...

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the...

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching markets and auctions has brought economic theory and practice together. Indeed, this is an area where microeconomic theory has had its largest direct impact. This is in part...

We study matching policies in a dynamic exchange market with random compatibility, in which some agents are easier to match than others. In steady state this asymmetry creates an endogenous imbalance: hard-to-match agents wait for partners, while easy-to-match agents can match almost immediately...

Priority structures are uncertain in real-life college admissions markets. This study investigates how information structures on priority affect resulting allocations. To do this, we focus on a class of real-life information structures that are represented as cutoff signals, which privately tell...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditionson participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that...

We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents. Time is discrete and horizon finite. Agents are in the market from the first date and, at each date, have to be assigned items (or bundles of items). When the social planner can only elicit...