We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students … Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi-experiment …The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi-experiment …The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete … admissions model where both schools and students are strategic agents, the school placement model where only students are … strategic agents and they induce an endogenous priority structure of schools over students, and finally the school choice model …