Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditionson participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that...

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

We analyze a dynamic matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

This article introduces a model of decentralized markets with frictions. In our framework, utility is imperfectly transferable between agents that can only trade through bipartite contracting. Economic outcomes are defined as pairs of a flow vector and a price vector.We prove the existence of a...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

We employ laboratory methods to study stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without...

We formalize a decentralized market where consumers with privately-known preferences meet bilaterally with firms. The latter acquire information to raise their degree of price discrimination from second to first. In a dynamic setting where outside options are endogenous, information choices are...