We study the effects of integration of asymmetric complements when they are vertically differentiated. While confirming the standard effects of integration, namely the internalization of the double marginalization externality and the reduction of competition, we point out a new positive quality...

This note is concerned with the effects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can...

This note is concerned with the e¤ects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can...

In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay or a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product...