This paper analyzes price collusion in a repeated game with two submarkets; a standard and a premium quality segment. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket...

We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equally-spaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...

We model the process of knowledge transmission among firms via workers' mobility as a multi-stage game. In our setup an idea to be realized needs that the agent informed about the idea recruits another agent from a pool of uninformed people. This constraint generates a recursive effect of...

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...