This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The basic assumption is that high-skill workers can perform both skilled and unskilled jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. Our first result shows...

This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The basic assumption is that high-skill workers can perform both skilled and unskilled jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. Our first result shows...

Using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), we identify workers who report having skills or qualifications for a more demanding job than the one they hold at the time of the interview. These overeducated workers are distinguished from non-overeducated workers. We further...

This paper considers a matching model with heterogenous jobs (unskilled and skilled) and workers (low and high-educated) which allows for on-the-job search by mismatched workers. The latter are high-educated workers who transitorily accept unskilled jobs and continue to search for skilled jobs....