We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and...

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...

In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator applies to repeated observations of matchings among a fixed group of individuals, which is a similar data structure as in Fox (2010). Our estimator is based on stability conditions in...

Most doctors in the NRMP match with one of their most-preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show...

In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (Amer. Econ. Rev. 102(1): 594-601, 2012) to show that under the assumption of unilaterally substitutable preferences a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries. In particular, my result applies to the...