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College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Pais, Joana; Pintér, Agnes; Veszteg, Róbert F. - 2008

experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350

Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution

Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 4, pp. 1659-1688

We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678871

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2017

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952674

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2017

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956538

Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2016

We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989559

Microeconomic models with latent variables : applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics

Hu, Yingyao - 2015

This paper reviews recent developments in nonparametric identi.cation of mea- surement error models and their applications in applied microeconomics, in particular, in empirical industrial organization and labor economics. Measurement error models describe mappings from a latent distribution to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010469057

Matching with myopic and farsighted players

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672526

Dynamic Many-to-One Matching

Altinok, Ahmet - 2020

We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842986

Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints

Jalota, Devansh; Ostrovsky, Michael; Pavone, Marco - 2022

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296003

von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082