Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can...

We analyze models where agents search for partners to form relationships (employment, marriage, etc.), and may continue searching for different partners while matched. Matched agents are less inclined to search if their match yields more utility and if it is more stable. If one partner searches...

The matching function describes the flow of job creation as a function of the stocks of unemployed and vacancies. Most empirical work tries to identify such a relationship by regressing the flow of matches (aggregated over the month) on the stocks of unemployment and vacancies measured at the...

This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the...