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We reexamine the existence of stable solutions in a class of three-sided matching problems previously studied by Zhang and Zhong (2021). The sets of participants are U, V, and W. Agents in U have strict preferences defined on V, agents in V have strict preferences defined on W, and agents in W...
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In matching problems with externalities, prudence measures the importance given to potential reactions when evaluating a deviation; social connectedness, on the other hand, measures the capacity to react to such deviations. Intuitively, a matching problem should be more likely to have a stable...
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We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected...
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This paper presents an alternative matching procedure and analyzes it is performance compared to other popular estimators. These tests show that the estimator performs comparably to the popular propensity score method.The proposed method involves the advantage of eliminating the in-convenience...
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