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In traditional school choice theory, the assignment mechanisms of students to schools suppose preferences for students and priorities for schools. In this paper, interested in the admission of students to colleges, we assume that all agents have priorities over the members of the opposite side....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010854389
This paper tests the explanatory and predictive power of a theory of dictatorship (e.g., Wintrobe 1998, 2007) when applied to the case of theocracy and in particular to the history of the temporal power of the Popes. We consider the behaviour of the Catholic theocracy in the Papal States, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969003
In a circular matching model, firms rank their applicants and pick the best suited one. Job creation appears to lower the average output. As firms do not internalize this effect, jobs are too many in the laissez-faire equilibrium under the Hosios condition. Due to similar externalities firms'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293461
Taking as a starting point the theory of matching applied in the case of a problem of college admissions, where one is interested only to strict preference profiles for students and colleges, a part of the literature has been oriented towards profiles of priorities for colleges. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393785