We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate … the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an … employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for …

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate … the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an … employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for …

better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However … depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches …

optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

search-matching models of the labor market. This 'intertemporal surplus sharing' (ISS) solution is usually defended as the … argue that such extreme assumptions on the risk of breakdown during disagreement are unattractive in the context of a search-matching …

relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a …

-like characterizations in the knapsack model of sharing economies and prove Border-like characterizations in a matching model that allows … each player to have arbitrary numbers of types, and in a ranked-item auction model with a group-specific quota constraint. …

We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all … principal can choose her preferred allocation (given constraints). The mechanism can be interpreted as a scoring auction. We …