The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a...

This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: firstly, the finiteness of such problems entails...

In traditional school choice theory, the assignment mechanisms of students to schools suppose preferences for students and priorities for schools. In this paper, interested in the admission of students to colleges, we assume that all agents have priorities over the members of the opposite side....

Choo and Siow (2006) [7] proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for random identically distributed McFadden-type noise in the preferences of each of the participants. In this note we exhibit a strictly convex function whose derivatives vanish precisely at the equilibria of their...

Abstract German (English abstract is added below) Arbeitslosigkeit gilt als eines der schwerwiegendsten gesellschaftlichen Probleme unserer Zeit. Doch welche Gründe liegen, trotz der über die Jahre eingeleiteten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit, für die anhaltende...

This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: firstly, the finiteness of such problems entails...

This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: firstly, the finiteness of such problems entails...

The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a...

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...

In the United States, prospective foster parents must become licensed by a child welfare agency before a foster child can be placed in their care. This paper contributes by developing a theoretical matching model to study the optimal menu of licenses designed to screen foster parents. We...