We estimate the effects of the vocational rehabilitation (VR) program run by the Canada Pension Plan Disability Program using administrative data. Identification relies on “selection on observed variables†plus careful comparison group selection and institutional knowledge regarding...

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their applications in three related domains. The first domain gives the theoretical background regarding the basic models,...

We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates...

We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This...

School choice aims to improve (1) the matching between children and schools and (2) students' educational outcomes. Yet, the concern is that disadvantaged families are less able to exercise choice, which raises (3) equity concerns. The Boston mechanism (BM) is a procedure that is widely used...